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Anxiety disorders are among the most common mental illnesses, with huge attendant 
suffering. Current treatments are not universally effective, suggesting that a deeper 
understanding of the causes of anxiety is needed. To understand anxiety disorders better, 
it is first necessary to understand the normal anxiety response. This entails considering its 
evolutionary function as well as the mechanisms underlying it. We argue that the function of 
the human anxiety response, and homologues in other species, is to prepare the individual to 
detect and deal with threats. We use a signal detection framework to show that the threshold 
for expressing the anxiety response ought to vary with the probability of threats occurring, 
and the individual’s vulnerability to them if they do occur. These predictions are consistent 
with major patterns in the epidemiology of anxiety. Implications for research and treatment are 
discussed.
Can J Psychiatry. 2011;56(12):707–715.
Clinical Implications
• Understanding the evolved function of the anxiety response can aid in 
understanding why people’s propensity to become anxious varies with their life 
circumstances and developmental history.
• Theory predicts that the threshold for mounting an anxiety response should depend 
on the probability of dangerous events occurring in the current environment, 
and the vulnerability of the person to those events should they occur. Numerous 
epidemiologic findings relating to anxiety disorders can be integrated within this 
framework.
Limitations
• The evolutionary criteria for when a mechanism is functioning adaptively are 
different from the criteria for identifying when a psychiatric disorder is present.
• Evolutionary thinking has not yet been used to develop new treatment strategies 
for anxiety disorders, although it may aid in understanding why existing ones are 
effective.
Key Words: anxiety, anxiety disorders, emotions, signal detection theory, 
behavioural ecology, evolutionary medicine
It is not informative to study variations of  
behaviour unless we know beforehand the norm 
from which the variants depart.1, p 109
Anxiety disorders are among the most common mental illnesses, with huge attendant quality of life and financial 
costs. For example, during 12 months in 2001–2002, 4.6% 
of Canadians had symptoms meeting DSM-IV diagnostic 
criteria for an anxiety disorder,2 and, during the course of 
their lifetimes, around 28.8% of Americans are estimated 
to be affected.3 Although treatments for anxiety exist, these 
currently have limited efficacy. For example, for GAD, 
antidepressants, though more effective than placebo, have 
a number needed to treat of 5.54, meaning nearly 6 patients 
need to be treated with the drugs to produce 1 more clinically 
significant symptomatic improvement than placebo.4 Only 
around 46% of GAD patients show a clinically significant 
response to psychological therapy.5 The pervasiveness of 
anxiety disorders and their resistance to treatment suggest 
a need for a deeper understanding of the sources of anxiety. 
We argue that to make some progress understanding clinical 
anxiety disorders, we need to start by obtaining a better 
understanding of the normal anxiety response: What is 
it for, and why does it have the features that it does? As 
evolution by natural selection is the source of all complex 
physiological—including neural—organization in nature, 
this necessarily means taking an evolutionary perspective. 
Our concern is specifically with generalized anxiety. 
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Anxiety is highly comorbid with depression, but we do 
not have the space to explore evolutionary approaches to 
depression (see instead Dr Hagen’s In Review paper6) or 
why their comorbidity would be so high. We also do not 
review the extensive evolutionary literature on specific 
phobias.7
Why Do People Become Anxious?
Behavioural biologists divide explanatory questions into 2 
broad categories: those concerning ultimate evolutionary 
function and those concerning proximate mechanisms.8,9 
The ultimate function of a structure refers to the reasons that 
the structure in its current form has been retained through 
evolutionary time, against the many alternative forms of the 
same structure that are thrown up each generation through 
genetic mutation and recombination. For example, the 
ultimate function of the pigmentation in the skin of humans 
is to protect tissue from the damaging effects of ultraviolet 
light. This claim is not a just-so story, because it makes 
principled predictions that can be tested in contemporary 
humans. It predicts that people whose skin colour is at the 
lightest end of the normal range of variation will suffer 
increased rates of cancers and other ultraviolet-related health 
problems, such as neural tube defects in their offspring. 
These predictions are consistently confirmed.10–12 Thus, 
given that these serious health problems affect survival and 
reproduction, we can state with some confidence that this 
account of the function of skin pigmentation is the correct 
one.
Mechanistic questions concern how a structure works. 
Human skin colour is produced by the pigment melanin, 
which is synthesized from the amino acid tyrosine in 
specialized cells called melanocytes, and transported to 
other epidermal cells in vesicles called melanosomes. 
These are all details of how pigmentation fulfills its 
function. Functional and mechanistic explanations can be 
pursued somewhat independently of one another in the 
first instance. We can work out what pigmentation is for 
without necessarily knowing all the details of how melanin 
is produced. However, the 2 must ultimately be integrated.13 
Functional thinking is potentially useful, even for the most 
mechanistically oriented researchers, as the function of a 
structure places constraints on how it can work and thus 
limits the search space of possible hypotheses researchers 
may want to pursue.
In psychiatric research, the focus has largely been on 
mechanistic explanations for symptoms of anxiety (for 
example, which drugs have anxiolytic or anxiogenic 
functions, and which brain areas and neurophysiological 
systems are implicated). While generally accepted that 
anxiety serves to prepare a person for threats,14 so far 
only a few pioneers have thought in any detail about the 
implications of this being anxiety’s function.15,16 We believe 
that there may be considerable benefit for clinicians and 
researchers in thinking more functionally, as this will shed 
light on the interconnectedness of the different components 
of anxiety and help guide and integrate research into the 
brain mechanisms involved.
Are Some Cases of Anxiety Disorder Adaptive?
One question that tends to arise when considering psychiatric 
conditions from an evolutionary point of view is where the 
boundary lies between evolved function and dysfunction. 
A mechanism is working functionally in the evolutionary 
sense if it has a level of responsiveness that will, averaged 
across all individuals and the environments in which they 
live, maximize survival and reproduction. This is a very 
different criterion from those used to demarcate clinical 
boundaries in psychiatry, which are mainly based on level 
of suffering and quality of life. If a mechanism is producing 
distress or impairing quality of life, this does not necessarily 
mean that it is malfunctioning in the evolutionary sense. 
For many adaptations, such as the pain system, it is part 
of their design that they cause subjectively unpleasant 
states, and individuals’ viability would be reduced if they 
did not do so under the appropriate circumstances. Thus, 
while undoubtedly some cases of anxiety disorder are 
pathological, in that the control mechanisms regulating 
the anxiety response have become dysregulated, it is also 
possible that some cases represent appropriate adaptive 
responses to the situation in which the person currently finds 
him or herself. As a corollary, insufficient anxiety-proneness 
may be a commonly occurring dysfunction. However, as it 
is not associated with subjective distress, presumably the 
people affected do not present for treatment.
Anxiety-proneness and anxious symptoms are distributed 
along a continuum in the human population, and symptom 
levels predict outcomes in a graded fashion.17,18 Moreover, 
epidemiologic evidence suggests that the probability of long-
term survival is lower in people with a low level of anxiety-
proneness than those in the middle of the distribution.19,20 
It is not even well established that, in people with clinical 
levels of anxiety, the anxiety necessarily impairs biological 
fitness. In a recent study,20 patients with clinically defined 
comorbid anxiety and depression had lower mortality than 
those with depression alone, despite having poorer health 
and more disability. All of this supports the view that clinical 
anxiety shares a continuum with the normal, protective 
anxiety response, and that locating the boundary between 
adaptive function and pathology is not straightforward, 
either philosophically or empirically. Moreover, the 
presence of dysfunction may not be the appropriate criterion 
for allocating treatment (for discussion, see Wakefield21 
and Cosmides and Tooby22). In view of this continuity, it is 
important to consider in detail the evolutionary forces that 
have shaped the anxiety response.
Abbreviations
ALR anxiety-like response
DSM Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
GAD generalized anxiety disorder
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Function of ALRs in Other Species
Evolutionary thinking in behavioural biology provides the 
researcher with a toolbox of different approaches. We will 
employ 2: the comparative and the optimality approaches.
Comparative Evidence
The comparative approach is based on comparing different 
species, or different populations of the same species, to 
discover the ecological correlates of a behaviour pattern, 
and thereby to test hypotheses about function. Psychiatrists 
have long employed comparative evidence from other 
species when thinking about mechanisms of anxiety (most 
psychopharmacology is done initially in animal models), 
but there is scope for greater use of comparative evidence 
in also investigating function.
Animals of many species display a suite of responses that we 
call the ALR in their normal behaviour. The ALR consists of 
increased heart rate, stress hormone secretion, restlessness, 
vigilance, and fear of potentially dangerous environments, 
and decreased feeding and exploratory behaviour. It also 
involves an increased tendency to interpret ambiguous 
stimuli as threatening.23–25 In Belding’s ground squirrels 
(Spermophilus beldingi), the components of the ALR are 
more strongly expressed in populations facing higher levels 
of predation.26 Differences in stress hormones in high- and 
low-predation environments are detectable within a few 
weeks of the pups emerging from the nest. This suggests 
that the function of the ALR is to detect and deal with 
threats, specifically from predators in this case. The changes 
in physiology, cognition, and behaviour characterizing the 
ALR can be interpreted as ways of fulfilling this function. 
The cognitive changes increase the likelihood that imminent 
threats will be detected early, and, at the physiological level, 
the ALR prepares the body for action by hyperventilating 
to oxygenate the blood, diverting blood to the muscles 
and sweating to cool the skin. Thus both the contexts in 
which anxious symptoms appear and the nature of these 
symptoms support the view that the function of anxiety is 
to prepare, physiologically, cognitively, and behaviourally, 
for detecting and dealing with threats to survival.
An Optimality Approach
Optimality approaches in behavioural biology involve 
building theoretical models of what behaviour we ought 
to expect if the structure has indeed been selected to fulfil 
the function we hypothesize (for an example in the context 
of low mood, see Nettle27). Model predictions can then be 
compared to actual data on the behaviour in question. We 
have already suggested that the function of anxiety is to 
prepare the individual for threats. How should such a threat 
detection system be designed? Nesse28,29 introduced the 
use of signal detection theory to address this problem, an 
approach we extend here.
Signal detection theory is a body of mathematics concerned 
with the problem of how to decide whether a given event 
has occurred (here, the event is whether a threat is present; 
for example, was that rustle in the bushes a tiger or only 
the wind?). Ideally, sensory evidence would indicate this 
unambiguously, but, in practice, there is fluctuating ambient 
noise; although, on average, tigers make more rustling than 
the wind, in some instances a tiger generates less rustling 
than in other instances where there is no tiger. Therefore, 
there are overlapping distributions of cue intensity reaching 
the receiver from environments with tigers and from safe 
environments (Figure 1). The receiver must establish some 
criterion (called the signal detection threshold) above 
Figure 1  The signal detection problem
The horizontal axes represent the strength of sensory information reaching the subject, while the 2 normal distributions represent the 
probability of different amounts of evidence generated under the presence of a threat, and under background noise only. Crucially, the 
2 distributions overlap. If the subject sets a high threshold for mobilizing a threat response (left panel), there will be a fair number of real 
threats missed as well as a fair number of false alarms. If the subject sets a lower threshold (right panel), the subject will miss many fewer 
real threats, but only at the cost of much more frequent false alarms. We argue that anxiety disorders represent unusually low personal 
thresholds for threat response.
Threshold Threshold
Threat
Background 
noise
Misses                    False alarmsMisses                    False alarms
Threat
Background 
noise
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which they will accept the evidence as indicating that the 
event is present (here, a level of rustling they will accept as 
sufficient to prepare for a tiger). Below this threshold, the 
rustling is dismissed as noise. Because the 2 distributions 
in Figure 1 overlap, any threshold that the receiver sets 
will generate some errors; it is impossible to set a threshold 
where the outcomes are all correct, whether detections (hits) 
or rejections. Specifically, there will always be some false 
alarms, where the receiver prepares for a tiger when it turns 
out to be nothing but the wind, and some misses, where the 
receiver does not prepare but there is a tiger.
The optimization problem concerns where to set the 
threshold. In general, there is a direct trade-off between the 
frequencies of false alarms and misses; raising the threshold 
will reduce the former but only at the expense of increasing 
the latter. The optimal threshold (λ) for the receiver to adopt 
can be derived mathematically,30 and can be simplified for 
our purposes as follows in Equation 1:
m= pt
pnt : wmiss
w fa
where p
nt
 and p
t
 are the probabilities of there being no 
threat present, and a threat present, respectively, and w
fa
 and 
w
miss
 are the respective costs of a false alarm and a miss 
(see also Haselton and Nettle31). Note that costs here are in 
terms of biological fitness. Thus, if misses usually lead to 
death, w
miss
 is very large. The p
nt
/p
t
 term is determined by 
the objective chance that a threat is imminent (that is, the 
threat probability). We call the w
fa
/w
miss
 term the individual’s 
vulnerability, as it specifies how bad it would be for that 
individual’s fitness if a real threat went undetected.
A couple of predictions follow from this equation 
(summarized in Figure 2). First, as the actual prevalence of 
threats in the environment goes up (that is, the probability 
increases), the optimal threshold for mounting the ALR 
gets lower. This means that when an optimally behaving 
animal is in an environment where there is objectively a lot 
of danger (or where it has received prior cues that dangers 
are frequent), it should require much less evidence of the 
presence of a threat to trigger the ALR than it would when 
in a safe environment. This means we should predict that 
animals will display many more anxiety symptoms in 
such environments. Some of the additional ALRs will be 
hits, owing to the greater prevalence of threats, but many 
will be false positives, as lowering the detection threshold 
necessarily entails increasing the false alarm rate. Figure 2 
shows that as probability increases, the optimal threshold 
decreases initially at a faster than linear rate, which means 
that as the hit rate goes up, the false alarm rate goes up 
even faster. Thus, as the individual’s best estimate of the 
amount of danger around goes up, the amount of both 
correct and baseless threat responses ought to increase. We 
have already seen that this prediction holds in the case of 
Belding’s ground squirrels.
The second prediction is that the relative costs of false 
alarms and misses (that is, the vulnerability) will affect the 
threshold. If misses are generally costly, as seems reasonable 
for the detection of mortal dangers (“few failures are as 
unforgiving as failure to avoid a predator”32, p 619) and the 
cost of a false alarm is only some unnecessary vigilance and 
increased heart rate, then an optimally functioning system 
will produce many times more false alarms than misses. 
This is Nesse’s smoke detector principle28,29; when they 
are set correctly, smoke detectors go off when there is no 
fire moderately often, but never miss a real fire. Setting the 
threshold higher may be nicer for residents of the building, 
who would not have to troop outside for no reason so often, 
but in the longer term it would be suboptimal, as one missed 
fire is a catastrophe.
More specifically, though, any factor which affects the 
individual’s ability to cope with the danger, and which 
thereby increases the likely cost of a miss for that individual, 
ought to cause that individual to lower their threshold 
accordingly. From Figure 2, we can see that an individual 
with higher vulnerability has a lower optimal threshold 
for any given level of probability than a less vulnerable 
individual. For example, this means that animals ought to 
have a lower threshold for mounting an anxiety response 
when they are lame than when they are healthy, and when 
they are in an environment with no cover, compared with 
one with cover. There is certainly evidence for such effects, 
both from the laboratory and the field. In the laboratory, 
Figure 2  The optimal threshold for mounting a threat 
response, as a function of the probability of that threat being 
present in the environment, for individuals with 3 levels of 
vulnerability
Values are generated from Equation 1, with the vulnerability 
term set at 0.1, 0.33, or 1.0. Increasing the probability of 
threatening events occurring always lowers the optimal threshold 
for responding, as does increasing the individual’s personal 
vulnerability to threats should they occur.
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placing animals in isolation or exposed settings produces 
increased ALR, including cognitive changes toward 
interpreting ambiguous stimuli as negative.24,33 In the field, 
individuals who lack cover, are far from conspecifics or at 
the margins of social groups, show increased vigilance.34,35 
Pregnant and nursing females are also more vigilant.36,37 
Presumably these effects are due to individual vulnerability 
in the event of an attack being elevated. Additionally, in reef 
fish Chromis dimidiata and Pseudanthias squamipinnis, 
individuals who have had access to a cleaner wrasse have 
an attenuated stress response, compared with individuals 
who have not.38 The interpretation of this finding is that 
cleaner wrasse, by removing ectoparasites, keep the fish 
in better overall health. Better health means their ability 
to cope with subsequent threats is greater, and thus, in our 
terms, their vulnerability is lower. Thus it makes sense that 
their threshold for mounting an ALR would be higher.
In summary, we expect an ALR optimized by natural 
selection to exhibit the following features.
1. Its ease of evocation would not be fixed but rather 
modulated, depending on the individual’s environment 
and current state.
2. It would be more readily evoked in environments 
where threats are more common (that is, where the 
probability is high).
3. It would be more readily evoked when individuals 
are in a condition that means they will find it difficult 
to cope with undetected threats (that is, where the 
vulnerability is high).
4. It will consist of a suite of physiological, cognitive, 
and behavioural changes that divert the individual’s 
resources from other concerns, and facilitate the 
detection of and response to threats.
5. Even when functioning optimally, the system will 
produce many more false alarms than hits, and the 
greater the probability and vulnerability, the greater 
the ratio of false alarms to hits will be.
There is some support for at least the first 3 of these 
propositions from nonhuman examples. To what extent, 
though, do they help us understand anxiety in humans?
Application of the Evolutionary Approach to 
Anxiety in Humans
Let us assume that human anxiety is the homologue of the 
ALR found in many other species and that it serves the 
same function, to detect and prepare for threats. How does 
what we know from the psychiatric literature fit in with this 
assumption?
Implications for Symptoms of Anxiety
Many symptoms of human anxiety, although unpleasant, 
make functional sense in the terms we have outlined (Table 
1). At the cognitive level, vigilance is increased, threatening 
information is given processing priority,39 and ambiguous 
information is interpreted as threatening40 because threats 
are judged as more likely to occur41,42 (though see Nesse and 
Klaas43). The functional interpretation of these changes is 
obvious. We make a more specific claim: anxiety disorders, 
specially, GAD, can be equated to having a low threshold 
in the signal detection model. This makes sense of many 
GAD features, which are basically extreme forms of the 
normal anxiety response features outlined in Table 1. The 
DSM-IV specifies that the anxiety must be characterized as 
excessive for a period of at least 6 months.44 The excessive 
in this condition is hard to operationalize exactly, but 
it could be taken to mean the presence of threat-related 
cognition with an unusually high proportion of false alarms. 
Such a high proportion follows directly from having a low 
threshold. The other GAD symptoms—for example, sleep 
difficulties, tension, and poor concentration—all follow 
straightforwardly from the person’s threshold for threat 
detection being set so low that almost any information from 
the external environment becomes significant to provoke a 
response. We side-step the question of whether the threshold 
is low owing to system malfunction—pathology—or 
that being the best threshold for that person’s current 
life situation. No doubt it varies from person to person. 
Moreover, we ought to expect there to be both traitlike (that 
is, temperamental) variation in where people’s thresholds 
are, and within-individual change in thresholds according 
to their current life situations. Nonetheless, GAD’s suite of 
symptoms is coherent and can be linked to having a low 
threshold in the signal detection model.
Implications for Epidemiology
If anxiety has the functions suggested for the ALR in our 
section Function of ALRs in Other Species, and if the signal 
detection model is a good framework for understanding 
its design, we can make clear predictions about the 
epidemiology of anxiety. These really all come down to 
2 claims: as the objective probability of threats increases, 
so should the severity of anxious symptoms, and as the 
vulnerability of people to threats, should they occur, goes 
up, so should the severity of anxious symptoms. Many of 
the specific epidemiology patterns observed in the literature 
can be related to these 2 claims (Table 2). We find the 
evolutionary framework useful in that a large number of 
empirically derived associations presented in the literature 
Table 1  Symptoms of anxiety and their function in defence 
against potential threats
Symptom Functional significance
Easily startled, hypersensitive 
to noise
Response to threat easily 
evoked
Insomnia Constant alertness
Restlessness, increased heart 
rate
Body is prepared for action
Preferential attention to cues 
related to threats
Notice threats sooner
Interpretation of ambiguous 
information as threatening
Reduce probability of missing 
possible threats
Ambiguity aversion Avoidance of situations whose 
threat level is unclear
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as unconnected all emerge from the general framework in 
a coherent way. Some of these are obvious and would have 
been predicted anyway, but others, such as the strong effect 
of loss of physical mobility on anxiety, are not intuitive 
until one adopts the evolutionary view.
Implications for Therapy
We believe that the framework outlined here could be 
useful for developing novel approaches to treatment, or at 
least refining existing ones. The effects of actual levels of 
probability and vulnerability must be mediated by a person’s 
appraisal (conscious or otherwise) of their probability 
and vulnerability.60 This means that relief of anxiety can, 
in principle, come in 2 ways; reducing people’s objective 
probability and vulnerability, and changing their appraisals 
thereof, which may or may not be realistic (for a related 
discussion, see Nesse and Ellsworth61).
Some existing therapies can work by changing appraisals of 
probability–vulnerability. Cognitive therapies62 for anxiety 
may address either the vulnerability or the probability 
term of Equation 1. Recalibrating either probability or 
vulnerability ought to result in raising the threshold for 
evocation of anxious symptoms. Exposure therapy is a 
long-established and often effective framework for treating 
specific phobias, which involves the controlled exposure 
of the patient to the source of the anxiety.63 Exposure 
therapy may be having its effect by recalibrating the 
person’s estimate of the probability of a specific threat 
occurring; if the patient can handle a dog many times, and 
never experience it responding with threatening behaviour 
(“repeated disconfirmation” is a term used to describe the 
therapeutic methodology in this source”), then their best 
estimate of the probability term in Equation 1 for the case of 
dogs will be much lower. Their threshold for the evocation 
of anxious responses when dogs are in the environment 
should thus be raised, and symptomatic relief follows.
Drug treatments for anxiety disorders work by down-
regulating threat detection mechanisms pharmaco logically. 
An interesting possibility raised by our analysis is that 
drugs that treat nonanxiety-related symptoms that feed into 
perceived vulnerability, such as, for example, providing 
good analgesia to someone with chronic pain, may also 
reduce symptoms of anxiety.
The perspective outlined here draws attention to the fact 
that at least some people may be anxious because they 
are correct to be anxious. That is, their appraisals of high 
probability and vulnerability may be relatively realistic, and 
their symptoms, although unpleasant, reflect an adaptive 
response to this situation. Thus, on a holistic view, it is 
a priority to address ecological issues, such as poverty, 
economic insecurity, lack of social support, poor housing, 
and urban safety, as well as challenging people’s cognition. 
These ecological factors are strongly associated with mental 
distress at both the individual and the societal level.64 
Tackling these factors will shift the population distributions 
of experienced probabilities of and vulnerabilities to threats, 
and thus ought to have population-level benefits regarding 
lower rates of anxiety.
Table 2  Epidemiologic associations with anxiety that can be interpreted from the standpoint of the signal detection model
Pattern Reference Interpretation
Low birth weight predicts higher trait anxiety later in 
life
Lahti et al45 Higher vulnerability: low birth weight 
individuals in poorer somatic state and have 
higher lifelong vulnerability to mortality and 
morbidity
Low socioeconomic position associated with greater 
anxiety
Najman et al46 and
McMillan et al47
Higher probability and vulnerability: low 
socioeconomic position characterized by 
more bad events, and fewer resources to 
cope with them when they occur
Injuries or disabilities causing loss of physical 
mobility associated with increased anxiety (and this 
seems to be independent of the association between 
depression and physical conditions48)
Cano et al,49 Suh et al,50 
Lenze et al,51 and Bellin et al52
Higher vulnerability: loss of mobility reduces 
people’s ability to deal with threatening 
situations
Members of discriminated-against minorities have 
less anxiety when living in neighbourhoods with 
more people of the same ethnicity
Das-Munshi et al53 Higher probability: probability of threats 
higher for minority individuals suffering 
discrimination when there are few others 
nearby
High absolute levels of anxiety in Zimbabwe, Central 
African Republic, and Gaza Strip
Langhaug et al,54 Vinck and 
Pham,55 Elbedour et al56
Higher probability: high rates of violence, 
unrest and disease mean probability of 
mortal threat is high in these environments
More anxiety among women than men Breslau et al57 Higher probability and (or) vulnerability: 
greater level of threat and (or) vulnerability 
to threats among women than men
Anxiety associated with living alone or being a lone 
parent
Rimehaug and Wallander58 Higher vulnerability: threats more difficult to 
cope with in the absence of social support
More anxiety among women suffering domestic 
violence
Tolman and Rosen59 Higher probability: prevalence of physical 
danger is higher for such women
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If we accept that some cases of clinical anxiety may represent 
adaptive responses to the situations in which people find 
themselves, this raises an important question about the 
consequences of treatment. If the treatment involves 
reduction of actual levels of probability or vulnerability, 
this is fine, because reduced anxiety is appropriate in these 
circumstances. However, if cognitive or pharmacological 
treatment involves a change in a person’s appraisal of the 
levels of probability or vulnerability without a change in the 
real levels, then there is a danger that this could increase the 
chances of a miss, with dire consequences for the person. 
Removing the battery from a smoke detector may seem like 
a good solution to frequent false alarms, until a real fire 
hits. The very fact that evidence is starting to accumulate 
that anxious people are less likely to suffer various forms 
of mortality should at least make us question whether there 
may sometimes be huge costs to inappropriately treating 
anxiety disorders.
Conclusions
We have outlined a simple functional framework for 
understanding human anxiety and homologous responses 
in other species. An individual’s threshold for mounting a 
threat response ought to be sensitive to the likelihood of bad 
things happening in the environment (probability), and the 
individual’s ability to cope if they do happen (vulnerability). 
If either increases, the individual anxiety response should 
be more easily triggered, and should therefore produce a 
greater number of false alarms. Epidemiologic patterns of 
anxiety symptoms can be interpreted within this framework, 
and existing treatments for anxiety disorders can be 
understood as reducing the patient’s appraisal of either their 
probability or vulnerability.
The evolutionary perspective we have outlined does not 
immediately change what psychiatrists do. However, it does 
bring a broader biological lens to bear on a complex issue 
that is associated with a huge burden of human suffering. 
It raises the potential for integration between psychiatric 
research and the rich traditions of research in behavioural 
ecology and ethology. It may lead to fresh, more holistic 
public health approaches to anxiety prevention, and 
stimulate further research by promoting the exchange of 
ideas between scientists working on research topics as 
diverse as epidemiology, neurobiology, clinical psychology, 
and animal behaviour. In particular, thinking in evolutionary 
terms draws attention to the way high levels of anxiety may 
be associated not only with neural malfunction but also 
with genuinely dangerous or precarious life situations. That 
is, to understand behaviour, one must consider what is not 
only inside the organism but also going on in the organism’s 
immediate environment.
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Résumé : L’anxiété : une approche évolutionnaire
Les troubles anxieux comptent parmi les maladies mentales les plus répandues, et une 
intense souffrance les accompagne. Les traitements actuels ne sont pas universellement 
efficaces, ce qui suggère qu’il faut une compréhension plus profonde des causes 
de l’anxiété. Pour mieux comprendre les troubles anxieux, il est d’abord nécessaire 
de comprendre la réponse normale à l’anxiété, ce qui veut dire examiner sa fonction 
évolutionnaire de même que les mécanismes qui la sous-tendent. Nous alléguons que 
la fonction de la réponse humaine à l’anxiété, et des homologues d’autres espèces, est 
de préparer la personne à détecter et à traiter les menaces. Nous utilisons un cadre de 
détection des signaux pour montrer que le seuil d’expression de la réponse à l’anxiété 
devrait varier selon la probabilité que des menaces se produisent, et selon la vulnérabilité 
de la personne à ces menaces si elles sont présentes. Ces prédictions concordent avec les 
principaux modèles de l’épidémiologie de l’anxiété. Les implications pour la recherche et le 
traitement sont discutées. 
